



RAPORTY I ANALIZY

**LET US TEAR DOWN THE CURTAIN OF
SALTY WATER.**

**TRANSATLANTIC DIMENSION OF
TEMPORARY LABOR MIGRATION –
PERSPECTIVE OF CENTRAL EUROPE.**

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STRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

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INTRODUCTION

As International Organization for Migration stresses, labor migration has moved to the top of the policy agenda of many countries of origin and destination (www.iom.int/jahia/page706.html). The phenomenon of labor mobility has been shaped by three factors: demographic and labor markets pressure in receiving countries, poverty and unemployment in sending areas and a network of migrants at the two ends of the spectrum. These factors will play a crucial role in the future as well. Although a large proportion of labor migration occurs in an irregular way governments are developing regulatory mechanisms to manage labor mobility. Even in the United States – a country traditionally using irregular path of migration as the main source of the foreign labor recruitment the recent immigration debate focused on possibilities to create temporary workers programs in order to relieve pressure on the border.

The opening of labor markets by the UK, Ireland and Sweden in May 2004 for workers from eight new member states was supposed to serve, for receiving economies, as a kind of guest-workers' supply program. Recent tendencies in Irish discourse when some politicians propose foreign unemployed workers to get a lump sum payment of up to six months' worth of unemployment benefit on the condition they agree to return home, support, in my opinion, this thesis (<http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2008/0905/1220544893448.html>). Associations with the migratory 'climate' after 1973 oil-crisis seem to be inevitable.

At the beginning of this century, the European Union became a global leader in attracting immigrants both in terms of immigrants stocks and flows. This deep transformation in the global migratory geography was the result of strategies in immigration policies in both the US and in the EU-15 countries.

The shift in strategy of American and European migration policy in the field of labor migration is connected not only with internal political transformations, but also with global processes. As a result of events of 11 September 2001 the migrations became an issue remaining in extremely close connection with internal security. The hitherto expressed anxieties of politicians and mass media representatives, concerning the phenomenon of illegal immigration worldwide that – according to opinion of some of them – has slipped out of control, have taken a new dimension.

However, Teitelbaum (2002) considers the statements in concern with global migrational pressure exceeding the state control abilities as gravely exaggerated. To confirm his thesis, he quotes the words of French analyst Patrick Weil, who stated, after having compared changes and directions of migration's policy development in Germany, France, United Kingdom and USA, that:

The recent evolution of immigration policies demonstrates the adaptability of the democratic developed States. In reaction to increased migration pressure and the extension of rights of migrants, States have answered by mobilizing more legal, financial and bureaucratic means. Therefore the transformation of migration into a world-wide phenomenon has not automatically involved an increase in immigration flows. When the level of uncontrolled flows is still high, as in the United States, it depends more on cultural and historical than on economic or demographic factors (Weil, 1998:18).

This paper is a testimony of a period of important geopolitical changes and modernization, and of the accompanying deep transformations, both quantitative and qualitative in their nature, in the area of international mobility as perceived in its transatlantic, European (EU), and Polish (Central European, new member states) dimension.

The author, basing on the analysis of the strategies for the migration policies of two countries: the USA and Great Britain, both of which are united by the transatlantic idea and cooperation, seeks and answer to the fundamental question about the factors underlying a state's decision not to spare efforts and initiate the required changes in its migration policy.

On both the sides of the Atlantic there are countries with a similarly long history of being immigrant-receiving territories and with a similar culture in this context. Both of them have worked on effective mechanisms to absorb migrant labor force for years, in both of them there are migration channels that have stood the test of time, and both of them have a strong tradition of receiving and accepting migrants.

The attempt at reforming the American migration law by the administration of George W. Bush in the years 2004-2007, and the opening of the British labor market to migrants from the new Member Countries by the government of Tony Blair in 2004 constitute the fundamental changes leading towards the liberalization of the migration policies in both of the countries: either with regard to the legal labor migration management (Great Britain, and a failed attempt on the part of the USA), or as regards visas (the USA) or a radical change in the traditional flow directions (Great Britain).

Great Britain's active and liberal migration policies in the area of labor migration which had led to a mass migration from Poland met with a response on the part of Poland which amended its own immigration law. The changes resulted in a gradual but quick liberalization of the rules governing the access of migrant workers from the eastern neighboring countries to the Polish labor market. The restrictive policies of the USA towards legal migration from Poland, in combination with the liberalization of the relevant policies on the part of Great Britain, Ireland, or Sweden, have resulted, to a considerable degree, in a decrease in the historically and emotionally positive attitudes towards the USA, and, in consequence, to a fall of the American myth as a temporary and settlement migration destination in the eyes of young Poles.

RECENT US IMMIGRATION DEBATE

Latest debate concerning immigration in the USA involved and still involves four important issues: strengthening of southern borders, facilitating of access to citizenship, regulating of status of illegal immigrants and working out labor migration programs. The main current in the discourse is related to the illegal influx from South America, whereas the matter of visas, including lifting thereof for new EU member states is a marginal issue in the immigration debate from the American point of view.

The latest immigration debate in the USA disclosed existence of powerful pressure groups promoting greater influx of legal wage immigrant's instead of traditional using the illegal emigrants inflowing in large numbers from the South America countries by the employers. The framework of the discussion on internal security and immigration, sharpened after the events of 11 September 2001, revealed the contradiction between the American idea of multicultural society and a trend considering the Anglo-Saxon character of American culture as a superior value.

MIGRATIONS FROM POLAND TO U.S.- HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Many stereotypes associated with migration are rooted in the perception of population outflows and influxes as settlement migrations. A European crossing the Atlantic Ocean in search of a better life constitutes the embodiment of a migrant from the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries¹. He was never to return to his homeland. Therefore, these migration stereotypes are still alive in both researchers and politicians. When analyzing them, we use such words as „exodus” (in the case of sending countries) or „flooding” (in the case of receiving countries). However, as Hugo (2003) noticed, in the contemporary situation, a question arises whether temporary migration is really a prelude to permanent settlement?

Poland has been the country of intense migration. Post-war migration can be divided into direct emigrations (departures from Poland abroad, ending in temporary or permanent stays) and indirect emigrations, in the case of those who could not return to Poland after war and emigrated from current countries of stay².

The tradition of Polish emigration to the U.S. has a long past. The first information on Poles in Northern America dates back to the 17th century. The first, more accurate estimates of numbers of Polish people in the USA go back to the period prior to the First World War and suggest that there were 3 million Poles staying in the USA³. Descriptions of emigration from Poland to America indicate various reasons and waves of emigration. The latter range from the emigration of Polish peasants in the years 1890-1914, motivated by purely economic reasons and called the emigration of „founders” to war emigration of „soldiers” between the years 1944-1948 which was characterized by a relatively high level of education.

¹ Graham, H., 2004, 'Circular migration: Keeping Development Rolling'? Migration Information Source.

² Pilch, A. i M. Zgórnjak, (eds), 1984, *Emigracja z ziem polskich w czasach nowożytnych i najnowszych*, PWN, Warszawa.

³ Pilch A., 1988. 'Emigracja z ziem polskich do Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki od lat pięćdziesiątych XIX do r. 1918', in: Kubiak H., Kusielewicz E., Gromada (eds.) *Polonia*

Subsequent waves of Polish migration to the States include the economically-driven wave of „consumers” in the years 1950-1980 and the wave of „solidarity activists” in the years 1980-1989, motivated by mixed politico-economic factors⁴.

The most recent wave overlaps the period of economic transformation, with economically-driven emigration of whole families remaining the dominating type of outflow.

The analyses of magnitude of Polish emigration in a historical and transatlantic context revealed that labor migration as early as at the turn of the 20th century was perceived differently depending on whether it was to Europe or to America. At that time the myth of America as a paradise for emigrants was deeply rooted in the mentality of Poles. More importantly, what this myth included were both economic (high earnings) and moral (work ethos, Puritanism) factors.

Migration to Europe had definitely negative connotations. A migrant to Europe was described as „...he is walking about idly and becomes influenced by a city proletariat, with which he can get on with easily”, or: „...they make the most of world there, nobody to watch over them, no father, no mother and no priest, nobody to be afraid of ...”⁵. Unlike the migrant in Europe, the American one „...is bound to stick to his own kind and be controlled by them, or at least he is surrounded by people who work and save money diligently”⁶.

The myth of America is also that of a birth of a Polish peasant, who freed himself of a „villein soul” syndrome, “with its social value and power, the myth of a peasants’ Poland was projected onto the lands of a New World.”⁷

It is worth remembering that what has contributed to the emergence of the myth of America as a paradise for emigrants i.e. building enclaves for „their own kind” - is the U.S immigration policy with the reunion of families being one of its key components.⁸

⁴ Mostwin D., 1991, *Emigranci polscy w USA*, KUL, Lublin; Mostwin D., 1999. *Rodzina przeszczepiona z perspektywy trzydziestu lat*, Archiwum Emigracji, z.2. Toruń. Kubiak H., 1975, *Rodowód narodu amerykańskiego*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie; Walaszek A., 1994, *Światy imigrantów. Tworzenie polonijnego Cleveland 1880-1930*, Nomos, Kraków.

⁵ Thomas, W.I. i F. Znaniecki (1976: 29), *Chłop polski w Europie i Ameryce*, LSW, Warszawa, citation after Bukraba –Rylska (2007:29).

⁶ Bujak, F., (1903:101), *Żmija. Wieś powiatu limanowskiego*, Gebether i s-ka. Poznań, citation after Bukraba –Rylska (2007:29).

⁷ Duda-Dziewierz, K.,(1938:152), *Wieś małopolska a emigracja amerykańska. Studium wsi Babica powiatu rzeszowskiego*. Polski Instytut Socjologiczny. Warszawa-Poznań.

⁸ Slany, K., 1995, *Miedzy przymusem a wyborem, Kontynentalne i zamorskie emigracje z krajów Europy Środkowo-Wschodnie, 1939-1989*, UJ, Kraków.

MIGRATIONS FROM POLAND TO U.S.- CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT: OFFICIAL DATA AND GMF US-CIR SURVEY RESULTS⁹

OFFICIAL DATA

Migrations in Poland in the 1990s were primarily caused by a political system and socio-economic transformation which led to then apparently permanent changes in international mobility of population and gradual transition of Poland from an emigration country to an emigration and immigration country.¹⁰

At the beginning of the 21st century, the population of our part of Europe is witnessing yet another intense wave of migration in the economic circumstances associated with strengthening processes of European integration and globalization. The immigration component is quite visible in official Polish statistics, however the emigration factor is definitely prevalent. Along with the drop in birth rate, migrations were the second component of a real diminution of the Polish population.

New tendencies have been observed since the 1st of May 2004 in population flows in Poland which are predominantly associated with the change of the geopolitical situation, the latter being the driving force of multiplication of demographic, economic and social factors, leading to one of the biggest Polish migration waves in the post-war period.

The most recent estimates of the Central Statistical Office indicate that at the end of 2007 nearly 2.4 million Polish citizens migrated temporarily abroad, over 1.9 million to Europe.

More stringent enforcement of U.S. immigration policy, focusing to a large extent on the internal security dimension, has been observed since the 11th of September 2001. Increased restrictions of migration policy generally entail a decline in number of legal migrants, at the same time causing the increase in illegal migrants, responding to a permanent economic demand for cheap, foreign labor. It is not however the case of migration from Poland to the U.S.


The following tendencies in migration from Poland to U.S. have been observed since the European Union enlargement in 2004:

- numbers of legal immigrants have remained at approximately same level since 1996;
- position of the U.S. among the destinations of Polish labor migration shifted from number two (prior to the EU enlargement) to number five;
- U.S. became less attractive to young and educated people

⁹ Two surveys on labor migration from Poland to US and UK after 1 May 2004 were conducted within the scheme of grant #42043 'Costs and benefits of temporary labor migration. Policy solutions for new migration patterns'.

¹⁰Iglicka, K., 2001, *Poland's Post-War Dynamic of Migration*, Aldershot, Ashgate.

The chart 1 below demonstrates a rotating number of legal immigrants from Poland in the last 15 years. After the period of increased naturalization in the first half of the 1990s (numbers then varied from 20 thousand to 30 thousand), there was a dramatic decline in the number of legal residents (immigrants) coming from Poland. These numbers have remained at a fairly stable level, ranging from 10 thousand to 15 thousand.



Source: For years 1990-1997, Yearbooks of Immigration Statistics, DHS, Washington, various years; for years 1998-2007: www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2007/table03d.xls.

Data received from an American immigration bureau indicates that Polish people still form an ethnical diaspora. In 2005, out of a total number of 15 352 Polish legal immigrants 5 626 resided in the state of Illinois, 3 106 in the state of New York and 1 705 in the state of New Jersey, i.e. in the regions which have been traditionally inhabited by Polish immigrants for last two centuries.

As far as unauthorized immigrants are concerned while analyzing the total number of illegal immigrants in the US from Europe, which according to Hook, Bean and Passel (2005) reached 600,000 in 2004 only 300,000 came from the former Soviet Union, Poland and Great Britain. The more precise data on illegal immigrants from Poland are however, unknown. Definitely it is not a big number in the total stock of illegals estimated at 9-10 millions.

Table 1 Illegal immigrants in the United States by region and country of origin in 2004 (in%).

Region/Country	%
Mexico	57
Central and South America	24
Asia	9
Europe	9
Africa	6
Total	100


Source: Hook, Bean, Passel, 2005

EU enlargement in 2004 led to tremendously significant qualitative changes in international population flows. The data below (chart 2), generated from BAEL database and demonstrating the group of over 6 000 labor migrants who have stayed abroad for no longer than 12 months indicates clearly that the countries traditionally receiving the largest numbers of Polish migrants, i.e. Germany and the U.S., ceased to be the leaders in that domain. Great Britain has taken the leading position whereas the US shifted from the second place (occupied prior to EU accession) to fifth place. It is a significant drop, given the fact that the European leader - Germany - went down just by one place.



Source: Grabowska-Lusinska, Okolski, 2008

Decline of the U.S. popularity as a migration destination for young and educated people is also accentuated by official data on visa issuance. In 2007 only 13 500 students enrolled in the Work & Travel program which enables students to work and stay/travel in the USA during holidays for a period no longer than 4 months. In 2006 16 500 students participated in the program and 19 500¹¹ in 2005. We have witnessed in the last two years a decrease in the number of program participants by over 40% (see chart 3).



Source: Bielecki, 2008

¹¹ Bielecki, J. *Polacy nie śnią już o Ameryce*, Dziennik, 30.01. 2008

GMF US – CIR SURVEY RESULTS ON LABOR MIGRATION FROM POLAND TO US¹².

The results shown below refer to the survey research done in the summer and autumn 2007¹³. The objectives of the Project included research on:

- dependencies between the educational level and the amounts of money transferred by migrant workers;
- role of money transfers from migrant workers contributing to a better standard of living;
- role of visas /of liberal migration policies as impact factors in job migrations from Poland
- attractiveness of the countries being the main destinations for migrant workers from Poland;
- integration and assimilation of Poles in their host communities.

The survey research covered a group of 564 Poles employed legally in the USA under the Work and Travel Program.

It is impracticable to do this type of survey on random samples. Consequently, we decided on purposeful sampling.

With regard to Poles legally employed in the USA, we decided to run the interviews with participants in the Work and Travel Program in Poland. The Work and Travel Program enjoys widespread popularity. Over its more than dozen year long history tens of thousands of students have been legally offered placements at US companies under the Program. The Program is generally acknowledged as a highly renowned one. It is not unusual for students to apply for participation in it on an annual basis. Those eligible must be between 18 and 30 years old. Having regard to the fact that our interests were focused on the quantitative dimension of such phenomena as those including opinions on the US restrictive migration policies / the role of visas, on the attractiveness of the USA as a destination country for migrant workers and for potential settlers, and on contacts with Poles violating provisions of the US migration law, we have decided to do our survey on a sample of as many as 564 respondents despite the uniformity of the target population.

The sampling was purposeful, and the migration data were stratified by sex and by place of residence (area of origin). The idea behind such stratification is that the migration behaviors of the survey sample, however uniform it is, may differ due to such factors as the area of origin or sex.

As it follows from the Work&Travel experience, participation in the Program is dominated by population of small and medium-sized towns, with a higher percentage of men. In order to outline, in the general profile of the sample group, the qualities related to the area of origin of the participants in the Program we decided to interview

¹² Grant#42043

¹³ For detailed analysis of survey results see Iglicka, 2008

respondents both at universities and in dormitories. The survey covered students pursuing the full-time studying option, from two State-owned universities: the University of Warsaw (384 respondents) and the Warsaw School of Economics (180 respondents). The survey was conducted in the summer and autumn of the 2007 year. What deserves special mention here is that the survey covered, in a way, migration elite i.e. young people attending elite Warsaw-based State-owned institutions of higher education.

The results are not representative. The survey, as it was mentioned before, was done among 'migration elite': full-time students attending elite Warsaw universities. What is typical of that group is, in my opinion, their young age on the one hand (the average age of Respondent at the time of his/her leaving for the USA: 22.7 years old), and the surprising maturity of their opinions and attitudes, on the other hand. Our analysis of the survey allows reflection as below. The surprising factors:

- strong rationalization of the migration strategies and of the gains/losses account in the decision makers' migration calculus (number of visits to the USA -average earnings, earnings-savings-investments);
- ambivalent attitudes expressed in the opinions on the possible consequences of removal of the USA visa requirements
- number of contacts with Poles violating provisions of the USA migration law;
- strong rationalization of the argumentation respecting assessment of the attractiveness of the USA as a job migration destination compared to the EU in respect of the working conditions and the earnings;
- fall of the American myth in the context of migration of settlers;
- emotions expressed in the patriotic attitudes towards Poland and in the cultural differences between Poland and the USA;
- relatively high (as compared with the age) international mobility of the analyzed sample;
- higher international mobility of women.

It was men who were the predominant group in the sample (56%), with the remaining 44% of women.

Average age of the respondents at the time of their leaving for the USA: 22.7 years old.

In the analyzed sample 29% of respondents came from cities with population of over 200 thousand, while the countryside was represented by not even 3%. The largest percentage of respondents (60%) reported coming from small and medium-sized towns with population between 10 thousand to 200 thousand.

The interviewers asked about the number of visits to the USA under the Work and Travel Program. Where the number of such visits was considerable, the next questions referred to the last visit only.

Respondents who had left for the USA more than once accounted for 21% of the analyzed sample. It was women who showed a stronger inclination for repeated

visits. As many as 41% of them had left more than once under the Program as compared to 17% of the male respondents.

The territorial diversification within the group of migrants who had left for the USA more than once seems to be similar to that which is representative for the whole sample.

The average net earnings that prevailed in the survey sample amounted to 3,000 – 4,000 PLN¹⁴ per month. Such were the amounts reported by 30% of the survey respondents. What deserves special mention is the fact that the next most often reported earnings interval was that over 6,000 PLN (22% of the respondents)

The basic analysis of the survey sample structure shows a considerable differentiation with regard to the earnings level on the grounds of sex. As many as 31% of the male respondents and only 12% of the female respondents reported earnings that were in excess of 6,000 PLN. At the same time, the percentage of women reporting the lowest monthly earnings, in the interval between 1,000 and 3,000 PLN, was higher than that of men (17% compared to 11%). The average monthly earnings in the group of male survey respondents amounted to 4.720 PLN, and in the group of female survey respondents: to 4.230 PLN.

Both the male and the female respondents used the multiple-visit strategy to increase their average monthly foreign earned income. It should be remembered that within the survey sample it was women who showed a stronger inclination for repeated visits abroad. As many as 41% of them, as compared to 17% of men, left under the Program more than once. On the other hand, men seemed to be more efficient in using their networks of contacts and references resulting from their previous stays in the USA under the Program: the average monthly earnings in their group (male respondents who had made more than one visit to the USA) amounted to 5,500 PLN. By comparison, the average monthly earnings for the corresponding group of women amounted to 4,750 PLN.

80% of the respondents had brought home some savings from their stay in the USA. The percentage of men in that sub-group of the survey sample was higher than that of women (85% compared to 73%). Some respondents explained that the reason for their having no savings earned in the USA was their too low remuneration while in the States, and the unfavorable dollar exchange rates. In their opinion, it was more worth their while to spend the money earned in the USA on travelling around the States and on presents. However, it may be interesting to note that it was the female respondents, having their average monthly earnings lower than those of the male respondents, and accounting for a lower percentage of those saving the earned money, who reported higher savings. Consequently, the average amount of savings brought home from the stay in the USA per capita was that of 8,200 PLN for the women's savings, and of 7,600 PLN for the men's savings.

As for the appropriation of savings by the most commonly cited purpose (as systematized by the Author of this analysis: the respondents were free to indicate

¹⁴ As for October 2008 the exchange rate was 1 USD = 2.26 PLN

their own purposes), it did not differ for the respondents on the grounds of their sex. What seems odd here are the similar *homo economicus* attitudes adopted by both the male and the female respondents who indicated “stock investments” as the main purpose to which to apply their savings. Indeed, the years after 2004 marked in Poland a long boom in stocks which may partly explain such a conspicuous trend in the savings appropriation strategy followed by so many of the young people choosing, by virtue of their young age if not for any other reasons, more contemporary, but also more risky forms of saving money. What is meaningful in this context is the fact that it was only 7% of the respondents who deposited their savings earned in the USA in bank accounts. Additionally, some of the savings were also intended for tuition fees enabling further education, and for entertainment and travel abroad. This why the items “Current expenses / tuition fees” and “Foreign travel” top the list as numbers 2 and 3, accordingly. The dominant savings appropriation strategies adopted by respondents seem to be well thought over and highly rational.

Part of the survey was focused on a number of issues including a ‘map’ of contacts between the survey respondents and other Poles. We were going to find out whether, according to our respondents being young Polish people leaving for the USA under a well organized program offering legal job placements at American companies which means that they did not have to keep in touch with any Polish communities living abroad, the problem of Poles violating provisions of the American immigration law is a conspicuous one. While conducting the survey we put aside such issues as a possible impact of potential contacts with compatriots upon the social or economic status of the respondents. Our whole attention was focused on the quantitative dimension of the issue of illegal migrations from Poland. Unfortunately, the situation as reflected by the survey results was not too optimistic.

Most of the respondents (52% of them) met, while in the USA, Poles who, having been granted regular tourist visas, worked in the USA illegally. The respondents were of an opinion that it is common among Poles arriving in the USA as tourists to work illegally. This is additionally proved by the answers respecting the number of Poles met while in the USA. 37% of the respondents reported their contacts with 1 to 5 individuals, while 8% referred to a dozen or several dozen cases.

The situation related to illegal stays in the US seems slightly better. 38% of the survey respondents reported having met, while in the USA, Poles who had illegally extended their stays in the States after the visa expiry date. It is not easy to assess this value. However eager we could be to put it off by saying “It’s only 38%”, I would insist that it is, in fact, as much as 38 percent.

The survey has not provided explicit answers to the problem of visas perceived as migration policy instruments. 30% of the respondents were of an opinion that visa requirements would prevent them from seeking jobs in the USA, while according to others (36% of the sample) visas would have nothing to do with the frequency of their job migrations to the USA. The remaining sub-group held no views on this issue.

The survey reveals a clear differentiation of the visa-related opinions, by sex. For 41% of the female respondents removal of the visa requirements would not influence their potential decision on job migration to the USA. In the male respondents’ sub-

group the percentage of “YES” and “NO” answers was balanced, and fluctuated around 30 percent in both the cases.

Our survey was also focused on the attractiveness of the USA as a job migration destination for Poles after the EU enlargement.

For as much as 72% of the survey respondents a possibility to work legally in the USA is not an attractive option. In this regard, no differentiation of the responses on the grounds of sex could be noticed. The percentage of both the male and the female respondents to whom a job in the USA was not an attractive option fluctuated around 70 percent. As it has already been mentioned, the questionnaire also enabled the respondents to give full meaningful answers to a dozen or so questions, in addition to ticking the right possibility. The attractiveness of having a job in the USA was one of those issues on which we were interested to hear about the personal views of the respondents.

As in the case of the responses related to investing the savings in the analyzed sample, the maturity of the opinions given by the respondents on the attractiveness of a job in the USA was striking. The respondents made it clear that the issues of the EU enlargement (and the resulting “openness” of the labor markets in the EU member countries to Poles) and of the attractiveness of having a job in the USA should not be linked together. They were of an opinion that a decisive, negative factor was that related to the unfavorable dollar exchange rate resulting in a relatively lower level of earnings (90% of the responses). The remaining respondents pointed out higher traveling costs and longer distances (making it impossible to visit their families in case they get ill or homesick) emphasizing, at the same time, the fact that the said factors were of a permanent nature, and were irrelevant to the EU enlargement. A motif that appeared in a number of survey responses was related to the mutual Polish and American relations connected with the existence of national stereotypes.

What seems interesting is that the opinions given by the 13% of respondents according to whom chances for legal employment in the USA have not changed since the EU enlargement did not tie that fact to Poland’s accession to the European Union, either.

Compared to some of the above quoted results which were not always easy to interpret in an explicit manner, the data respecting the survey respondents’ overall potential for migration to the USA are unusually clear. As much as 80% of the respondents gave a negative answer. Naturally, asking the respective question we started with the highest level of generalization. As a rule, while surveying the migration potential one gets the highest percentage of affirmative answers to the question “Have you thought about moving out of the country permanently?”, and as one proceeds to more detailed questions the number of affirmative answers gets smaller. However, in the case of the analyzed sample negative answers prevailed on the level of the most general question.

The structure of answers, proved low attractiveness to the respondents of the USA as a migration destination, this time within the meaning of a migration destination for

settlers. What is interesting, in the grounds provided by the respondents for their individual decisions to remain in Poland an extremely emotional patriotic tone could clearly be heard.

What may be surprising is the relatively high international mobility of the analyzed sample. As much as 28% of the respondents who got employed in the USA at least once after 1st May, 2004, managed to get a legal job in a EU member country as well, within the same period of time (i.e. by the autumn of 2007). The proportions, by sex, were quite balanced: 29% of the male respondents and 27% of the female respondents worked in a EU member country after 1st May, 2004.

What is interesting, however, is the fact that in the group of female respondents who had experience of being employed in a EU member country as much as 35% of women reported having worked in the USA many times, while for men that proportion was much lower: 3%. Therefore, a more intensive international mobility of women is what deserves a special attention here.

As it has already been mentioned, one of the focus areas of our survey research was the attractiveness of the USA as a migration destination for job seekers. It was the attractiveness of the USA within this meaning, or as perceived by the respondents assessing it as a migration destination, that underwent our further testing, with participation of those survey respondents who had already had comparable migration experience. What we understand by comparable migration experience for the purposes of this survey research is legal employment in any EU member country after 1st May, 2004.

51% of the respondents who had worked in EU member countries as well opined that the working conditions in the USA were better. In general, those who considered the working conditions in the USA better than or comparable with those in a given EU country in which they worked after 2004 accounted for 59% of the sample. However, that assessment of the working conditions was strongly differentiated on the grounds of the sex of the respondents. Only 42% of the male respondents compared to as much as 64% of the female respondents were of an opinion that the working conditions in the USA were much better. What was different were the respondents' opinions on their earnings.

Opinions in favor of the EU prevailed: 63% of the respondents considered earnings in the EU higher, based on their own experience. There was no differentiation of opinions in the analyzed sample on the grounds of the sex. 68% of the male respondents and 57% of the female respondents gave similar answers on that score.

RECENT UK IMMIGRATION DEBATE

In the past decade the UK has experienced a sweeping change in labor migration, that took place both in policy framework of the country, and in the number of immigrants entering through regular channels. In years 2004-7 the country received the largest inflow of foreign nationals in its history. The inflow of foreign nationals

through regular channels, who stay on migration longer than one year, rose from 224,200 in 1996, reached a peak of 494,100 in year 2004, and amounted to 3.4 million in the years 1997-2005 (OECD 2007). The change has been initiated by a centre-left administration that regards selective labor migration as a part of strategy aimed at enhancement of global competitiveness in a knowledge-based economy, and that delightedly address labor shortages in a period of almost full employment. During Blair administration period (1997-2007), as much as five new immigration laws were introduced, more than in any other area of social policy (Somerville 2007).¹⁵ However, the changes have been rendered possible by a relatively docile opposition, and also media have generally accepted the economic reasons for labor migration (Boswell, 2007).

However, a simultaneous restriction of possibilities for humanitarian categories of migrants turned up along with this expansiveness, and more symbolic and exclusionary debate concerning integration, citizenship and Britishness, especially in the wake of 9/11 and the 7/7 London terrorist attacks. Nevertheless this more open approach to labor migration is not necessarily as sustainable as it is supposed to be, especially when one considers increase in concerns about the social impact of immigration from Eastern Europe (Boswell, 2007), as is suggested by recent media reporting and party political discussion.

MIGRATIONS FROM POLAND TO UK- HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Polish populace in the UK emerged a result of several emigration waves. The first wave of "soldiers" arrived in the UK during the World War II. The biggest of the Polish waves of emigration to the UK (estimated at approx. 140,000) took place in these very forties, in the World War II period and directly after end of the war (Sword, Davies, Ciechanowski, 1989). As early as in the forties, the London had become the site of the government of the Republic of Poland on emigration and remained as such until 1990. Strong Polish culture centers, both political and socio-cultural, were sympathetic to the following waves of migration of Poles to the United Kingdom, as well as migrations of economic character (the 1960-1980 period) or political ones (the eighties) (Gorny, Kolankiewicz, 2002).


MIGRATIONS FROM POLAND TO UK- CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT: OFFICIAL DATA AND GMF US-CIR SURVEY RESULTS

OFFICIAL DATA

Both settlement and temporary outflows from Poland after 1 May 2004 created the highest wave of migration during the whole post-war period with the small exception of the short period in the 1950s (see chart 4). At that time the rapid increase in the

¹⁵ Namely, the Immigration and Asylum Act (1999), the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002), the Asylum and Immigration Act (2004), the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act (2006), and the UK Borders Act (2007).

emigration was caused by Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (KC PZPR) that passed a resolution obligating the Ministry of the Interior to take a more favorable approach while considering ethnic German's applications to emigrate, and to grant emigration permits to individuals unfit for work, women, children and pensioners seeking to reunite with their families (Lempiński,1987).



Source: Statistical Yearbooks, Central Statistical Office, Warsaw, various years

According to the official statistics the rapid increase in the official number of emigrants after 2004 can be related to the decision about settlement in the country of labor migration and a willingness to avoid paying taxes in Poland for work performed abroad as well¹⁶. As it was already mentioned, during the last decades the official registered numbers of emigrants were at stable level 20-25 thousand annually. However, in the year 2006 the number of emigrants reached almost 47 thousand and in the following year 35 thousand (GUS, 2008).

¹⁶ The official definition of an emigrant used by the Central Statistical Office refers to a person who has requested to be deregistered from his/her permanent place of residence. A person registered as having his/her permanent place of residence in Poland also pays taxes there. The regularities discernible with respect to requests for deregistration, which, according to the report of the Ministry of the Economy (*Wpływ emigracji...2007*) due to the short period of comparison (2003 and 2005 only) should be treated with reserve, point to some rather characteristic changes in the regional distribution. Namely, in 2005 there was an increased number of requests for deregistration in northern, western and southern Poland, with a drop of figures in Opole Silesia and a part of Masuria. In the case of these two regions this may be an indication of a shrinking pool of potential migrants. The highest number of deregistrations was reported in voivodeship capitals with a population of over 200 thousand – Olsztyn, Rzeszów, Gorzów Wielkopolski and Zielona Góra (*Wpływ emigracji...2007:16*).

Table 2. Data on emigration and immigration in 2004-2007.

Year	Emigration	Immigration
2004	18,9	9,5
2005	22,2	9,4
2006	46,9	10,8
2007	36,3	15,1
		36

Source: Central Statistical Office data, various years.

Character of the post accession mobility of Poles and lack of proper registers in the receiving countries and measures in Poland make researchers unable to study trends in data. There are however, some estimates of migration from Poland after 1 May 2004 that can serve as quite good illustration of the volume of the mobility that occurred against all odds and took both the Polish and Western experts by surprise (see table 3 and 4). It does not seem reasonable, in my opinion, to argue whether the numbers reached one, two or three millions in reality. Both academics and policy makers are pretty sure that there are much bigger than expected and, that the scale of this mobility has plenty of social and economic consequences for both receiving and sending areas. The mechanisms of this migration wave seem to be of equal importance as well.

Table 3 Various estimates on scale of labor migration from Poland after 1 May 2004 (till end of 2005). (in thousand)

Source	Polish Ministry of Labor and Social Policy	Catholic Church	Media	Polish experts	ECAS* report
	669	1 000	2 000-4 000	1 200	1 120

* ECAS – European Citizen Action Service.

Source: Kłos, B. 2006, Migracja zarobkowa Polaków do krajów UE, Indos nr 2/2006, Biuro Analiz Sejmowych, October.

The most recent estimates by the Polish Central Statistical Office show that migratory flow from Poland did not stop in the year 2007 nor was it reversed. Dynamics of migration was lower however, the outflow still took place (see table 4).

Table 4 Temporary migration from Poland, 2004-2007^a (in thousand)

Country	Number of migrants				
	2002 (Census data)	2004	2005	2006	2007
Total	786	1000	1450	1950	2270
Europe	461	770	1200	1610	1925
In this UE (27)	451	750	1170	1550	1860
<i>In this:</i>					
Austria	11	15	25	34	39
Belgium	14	13	21	28	31
Cyprus	-	-	-	-	4
Czech Republic	-	-	-	-	8
Denmark	-	-	-	-	17
Finland	0.3	0.4	0.7	3	4
France	21	30	44	49	55
Germany	249	385	430	450	490
Great Britain	24	150	340	580	690
Greece	10	13	17	20	20
Ireland	2	15	76	120	200
Italy	39	59	70	85	87
Netherlands	10	23	43	55	98
Portugal	0.3	0.5	0.6	1	1
Spain	14	26	37	44	80
Sweden	6	11	17	25	27
Countries outside EU	10	20	30	60	65
<i>In this:</i>					
Norway	-	-	-	-	36

a) data pertain to the number of people staying abroad temporarily; for years 2002-2006 – longer than two months; for year 2007 - longer than three months.

Source: *Informacja o rozmiarach...* Central Statistical Office, Warsaw, 2008

Post enlargement labor migration has been characterized not only by its unique scale but also by some changes in socio-demographic characteristics of migrants. The 2006 Communication of the European Commission on the influx of workers from the new Member Countries to those Member Countries who “opened” their labor markets after 1st May, 2004, and the British data collected under the Workers Registration Scheme and the Labor Force Survey categorized the profile of a migrant in two groups mainly: a) young, educated people whose job positions were inadequate for

their level of education; b) average- and low-skilled workers with jobs adequate for their qualifications. Furthermore, as it was confirmed by CSO data – (see table 4), the regional changes concerning countries of destination have been seen as well.

GMF US – CIR SURVEY RESULTS ON LABOR MIGRATION FROM POLAND TO THE UK¹⁷

Questionnaire was applied to a target sample of 636 respondents. The sampling was purposeful, and the migration data were stratified with due regard to such categories as age, gender, education and jobs positions held in UK¹⁸. The survey research was conducted in London, in the autumn of 2007.

The objectives of the survey included research on:

- dependencies between the level of education and the amounts of money transferred by migrant workers;
- role of money transfers from migrant workers contributing to a better standard of living;
- attractiveness of the countries being the main destinations for migrant workers from Poland;
- tendency towards returning there;
- integration and assimilation of Poles in their host communities.

The analysis of the survey allows reflection as below. The most striking factors were as follows:

- relatively high (as compared to the young age and no work experience in Poland) international mobility of the analyzed sample, focused on job seeking;
- attitude to migration treated as, in a way, a survival strategy, and the resulting relation: work-saving money-work to which the whole life is subordinated;
- strong negation of Poland noticeable in the emotional responses to the question about possible returns;
- tendency to come back being stronger with the female respondents;
- positive opinions for UK and for plans to settle down there or to stay there for a longer time versus a complete lack of interest in the political life in UK manifesting itself in their non-participation in the local election, in particular in the context of the high level of education completed by the respondents;
- little interest in the political life of Poland manifesting itself in the last parliamentary election poll, in particular in the context of the high level of education completed by the respondents;
- lower readiness of the male respondents to establish closer relationships with their host communities, which is true, in particular, for the male respondents holding university degrees, as compared to bigger openness to such contacts proved by less educated male respondents and by the female respondents.

¹⁷ Grant #42043

¹⁸ For details see Iglicka, 2008.

It was the male respondents who were the predominant group in the sample (53%), with the remaining 47% of the female respondents.

The age group which prevailed among both the male and the female respondents was that including 25-30 year olds. They accounted for as much as 38% of all the respondents. Both the youngest (up to 20-year-old) and the oldest (55-60-year-old) respondents represented 2.5% of the sample. The average age of the male respondents at the time of conducting this survey was that of 30.2 years old, while for the female respondents that of 28.9 years old. The average age of all the respondents at the time of conducting this survey was 29.5 years old.

The respondents holding undergraduate or postgraduate degrees and diplomas accounted for 36% of the sample. That proportion amounted to 43% for women, and to nearly 30% for men. In general, respondents with experience of higher education courses done in Poland, which respects both undergraduate studies and postgraduate courses of study for a master degree, accounted for as much as 55% of the analyzed sample.

Both the young age of the respondents and their level of education are those variables which are responsible for a low level of activity of the analyzed sample in the labor market. 23% of the respondents had not been employed in Poland before leaving for UK. The activity of the women in the labor market was lower: as much as 29% of that sub-group did not have a job when in Poland, compared to 17% of the men. The most often reported reasons for not having any employment record in Poland included: 'I attended school', 'I was a student', 'I was unemployed'.

Considering the young age of the respondents, the sample demonstrated very high international mobility related to job seeking. As much as 75% of the male respondents and 64% of the female respondents had sought employment in other countries as well prior to their job migration to Great Britain. These results seem interesting considering that 23% of the respondents had had no former job experience in Poland.

The most popular destination country for job seekers was that of Germany.

Nearly 31% of the respondents had already had some experience of working in UK before the EU enlargement. The percentage of the respondents was not differentiated on the grounds of their gender in this respect. The said proportion, for both the male and the female respondents employed in UK prior to 1st May, 2004, fluctuated around 30%. This does not mean, however, that all of them settled in UK upon getting employed in that country. Issues pertaining to the duration of job migrations were reflected upon in the block of survey questions below.

By asking about the year of arrival in Great Britain we wanted to find out whether there were any settlement processes under way, whether the duration of the respondents' stays in UK was indicative of their permanent or long-term migration, and what the directions and effectiveness of the migration streams were.

27% of the respondents arrived in UK prior to the EU enlargement (1st May, 2004), and the remaining 73% after that date. However, if we take into account the fact that it was only 10% of the respondents who arrived in UK in 2007, we may be right to say that what is characteristic of the analyzed sample is their taking roots in UK in terms of the duration of their stays there, which is typical of long-term migrants. Those relatively long stays in UK, together with the respondents' attitudes toward coming back may also be clearly indicative of their settlement plans taking shape.

Migration streams intensifications were quite proportional over the years 2004-2006. In the year 2004 23% of the analyzed sample flowed in UK, and in 2005 that percentage was identical, reaching a similar level of 21% in the year 2006, but only as little as 10% in the year 2007. Those proportions have been confirmed by the Home Office latest data publications in which they indicated a decrease in the number of registrations under the Workers Registration Scheme pertaining to new Member Countries' citizens. It should be kept in mind, however, that the same British data sources refer to an increase in the number of dependants of the workers already employed in UK, which testifies to the migration growing in volume under the provisions on family reunification. The tendencies pertaining to the respondents' long-term or even permanent settlement plans which manifested themselves in this survey research seem to confirm the said direction of changes.

What constituted another area of interest for us in this survey research were also the patterns of social and economic behaviors adopted by the analyzed sample while looking for their first jobs in UK.

An overwhelming majority of the respondents (as much as 74% of them, including 71% of the male respondents and 76% of the female respondents) arrived in UK having no idea of what kind of work they would take up or what the working conditions would be over there. Therefore, one may say that neither the activity of job centers in Poland nor the Polish awareness-raising campaign on "opening" the UK labor markets were those factors which considerably facilitated the respondents' finding their first legal jobs in UK.

What was singled out as the key factor with a positive impact on finding the first legal jobs in GB by the respondents was (for both the male and the female respondents) the help rendered by their Polish contacts in UK. Consequently, the role of the Polish diaspora network of contacts in UK was decisive for the respondents' finding legal jobs there. Number Two determinant indicated by as much as 40% of the respondents was linked to the "Other" item. As it follows from the analyzed material, this category was most often referred to as "own initiative", including both its most intelligent and dynamic manifestations and those which were the most pains-taking ones:

11% of the female respondents and only 5% of the male respondents owed their jobs to the British who helped them find employment in UK. What seems to be interesting is that the data pertaining to the integration of Poles into the British society show a bigger openness of the female respondents to contacts with the local communities as compared with that of the male respondents. Perhaps it is just the absence of fear of

accepting help from the British in the initial phase of migration that gets translated into quicker integration further on?

We were also interested to hear about the jobs performed by the respondents, whether they corresponded with their qualifications or required lower level skills, and whether any of the respondents had been promoted at work.

65% of the respondents held jobs suitable for their qualifications. That group included individuals with completed primary or secondary education who found employment as average or low skilled workers. The occupations most often reported by that group of respondents included those of construction workers, plumbers, dustmen, shop assistants, caretakers in social welfare homes, carpenters, engineers, welders, store-keepers, leaflet distributors, metal coating workers, diggers, electricians, mechanics, etc.

What may be interesting is that a relatively high percentage of the respondents holding university degrees had found in UK jobs corresponding with their qualifications. However, those of the respondents with completed higher education courses who held jobs for which they had been trained at university were employed in Polish centers as more broadly understood. Therefore, I have also included in that group Polish language teachers (holders of a master degree in Polish Language and Literature) who had found jobs in Polish schools in London, journalists who had embarked on careers in journalism in UK working for Polish newspapers or for the Polish radio, as well as fresh graduates in English Language and Literature teaching English to Polish children in UK.

35% of the respondents, i.e. 27% of the male respondents and as much as 43% of the female respondents worked in UK in areas having nothing to do with their original qualifications. This was mostly true for respondents holding undergraduate and graduate degrees.

It was the average net monthly earnings (in PLN) ranging from 4,000 to 6,000 PLN¹⁹ that prevailed in the analyzed sample. Such were the amounts reported by as much as 34% of the survey respondents. As for the lowest net earnings ranging from 2,000 to 4,000 PLN, they were reported by 24% of the respondents, while the highest earnings (above 10,000 PLN) were reported by 10% of the respondents.

Our basic analysis of the sample structure reveals a significant differentiation in earnings on the grounds of gender within the highest earnings group. As much as 17% of the male respondents and only 3% of the female respondents reported the highest level of earnings: above 10,000 PLN. At the same time, the percentage of female respondents reporting the lowest earnings ranging from 2,000 to 4,000 PLN was similar to that of the male respondents in that sub-group, on the level of ca. 24%. The average monthly earnings in the sub-group of male respondents amounted to 6,404 PLN, while for female respondents it was 5,972 PLN. The average net monthly earnings of the analyzed sample amounted to 5,972 PLN.

¹⁹ As for October 2008 the exchange rate was 1 PLN – 4.3 GBP

65% of the respondents reported that they were able to save some money / that they had savings earned in UK. The percentage of male respondents in that sub-group was on the level of 68%, while the corresponding value for women was only 63%. Some of the survey respondents suggested that their stays in UK were too short so that they could save any money. The survey interviewers noticed that respondents were rather unwilling to give answers related to their savings and to the appropriation of such savings. The average net monthly savings earned in UK and reported by the respondents amounted to 1,230 PLN for the female respondents, and to 1.570 PLN for the male respondents. The average net monthly savings for the whole sample group were on the level of 1,400 PLN.

60% of the respondents who had savings reported sending them to Poland.

In most cases, the savings were wire transferred to Poland: as much as 52% of the respondents reported such transfers. However, the traditional method of bringing the saved money to Poland “personally, during travel home” also enjoyed considerable popularity: 35% of the respondents reported such “transfers”.

In general, those who were saving the money earned in UK could be divided into two sub-groups: those providing for their families, and those attempting to invest in Poland or in Great Britain (on their way to well-being). As for the most frequently cited investment, it was a flat of one's own: obviously the most desired objective and one difficult to reach for a number of successive generations of Poles. Unlike the surveyed students of elite Warsaw schools for higher education working in the USA under the Work and Travel Program who mostly appropriated their savings for stock investment, tuition fees, and entertainment / foreign travel, the repeating motif in the responses given by the “British” sample was that of everyday life as not seen through rose-tinted glasses. The collected material respecting the earnings and the savings of the analyzed sample, both in its quantitative and in its qualitative aspect, is a sad picture of a generation of those who have been, in a way, excluded, and whose migration is an attempt at securing a certain basic standard of living for themselves and for their relatives.

The collected material related to attitudes towards possible returns could be used to write a similarly pessimistic scenario. It is worth pointing out here that Poland seen by the “British” respondents is totally different from Poland in the eyes of the respondents who have migrated to the USA under the Work and Travel Program. A strong negation of Poland noticeable in the emotional responses gathered in the “British” survey is as surprising as the strong patriotic attitudes typical of the “American” survey.

As a matter of fact, most of the respondents (51% of them) answered that they wanted to come back to Poland as compared to 23% of those who were decided not to come back, but a further analysis of the time horizon for such returns, as well as the qualitative material gathered in the survey, are not indicative of a high level of certainty about their coming back, and, if so, such returns should rather be expected over a longer time horizon.

In general, the female respondents showed a bigger inclination to come back earlier. 37% of them stated their readiness to come back that year, or in 1-2 years' time. The proportion of the male respondents reporting their return planned over such a time horizon was on the level of 25%.

As much as 32% of the respondents stated that their return, if any, should take place no sooner than in 5-10 years' time. As little as 9% responded that they should come back as early as that year.

What results from the existing knowledge about the life of Poles (Polish job migrants) in UK after 2004 is that quite many of them have started thinking of settling down in UK as in their destination country. Quite a number of them are highly satisfied with their decision to stay on and settle down. What we wanted to verify through this survey research was whether the respondents had participated in the local elections in UK: it is obvious that Poles, as the EU citizens from the 2004 year, may take part in such elections held in any EU member country. Political participation is indicative of a political and social involvement in the problems of the destination country, and, in a way, a measure of the migrants' integration into the host community.

None of the respondents participated in the local elections in UK. It is worth mentioning that 6% of the sample did not understand the question. They thought that the opinions sought from them were to be about the election in Poland, and, by way of justifying their absence, they wrote (selection of the most interesting opinions, K.I.): "I cannot stand PiS (Law and Justice);", "I abhor communists;", "PO (Civic Platform) are wrigglers."

The justifications provided for the political non-participation of the respondents may be grouped as follows: 70% of the respondents replied that they were not interested in politics, that it was too soon for them to have a clear understanding of the political situation in UK, that they were still more concerned about the political situation in Poland. 10% of the respondents knew that such elections had been held during their stay in UK, but excused themselves by referring to their difficult economic situation:

10% of the respondents did not know whether there had been any local elections in UK during their stay there, while 4% claimed that there had been no such elections.

Although the surveyed respondents claimed that they were all the time concerned about the political life in Poland, this did not get translated into their more active participation in the last election. As little as 7% of the respondents took part in it. The preferences within that group (of 44 persons) were distributed among PO (Civic Platform: the prevailing number of the votes cast), LiD (Leftists and Democrats, second to PO), PiS (Law and Justice, Number Three), and PSL (Polish People's Party, Number Four).

As for the Polish election, it may be justifiable to think that in the future the percentage of those participating in such election should be higher as the respondents complained, first and foremost, about a disastrous organization of the election.

As for integration in Great Britain in general, it was the female respondents who had demonstrated greater readiness for establishing closer relationships, other than the working ones, with the British as compared with the male respondents. Nearly 59% of the female respondents had such relationships, when for the male respondents the corresponding proportion was on the level of only 48%. What is interesting, the male respondents holding undergraduate or postgraduate degrees proved a proportionally smaller number of contacts other than the working ones with the British as compared with men who had primary or secondary education completed. As for the female respondents, it was only those with high school or undergraduate diplomas who had fewer contacts other than the working ones with the British.

The grounds provided for weak personal relationships of the respondents with the representatives of the host communities included both the argumentation referring to cultural differences, and to the social and economic status of Poles in UK.

The above results are not representative. As it has already been mentioned, the survey research was done on a sample representative of the generation of the excluded ones who, through migration, strive to secure a certain basic standard of living for themselves and for their relatives. What is typical of that group is, in my opinion, their young age on the one hand (the average age of Respondent at the time of the survey research: 29.5 years old), and their high level of education and low level of activity in the labor market in Poland, on the other hand. The profile of the sample is that of long-term migrants with quite clear plans to settle down in UK.

COSTS AND BENEFITS ANALYSIS OF LABOR MIGRATION– DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE OF A SOURCE COUNTRY

The scale of post accession migration wave took experts by surprise. The character and scale of migration from Poland are of considerable significance, not only for politicians in the CEE countries, but also for those shaping EU migration policy and those involved in European integration. There are plenty of economic and social consequences of the outflow of migrants that are of great importance for both receiving and sending areas.

Since the beginning of 1970s the registered outflow from Poland oscillated at 20-25 thousand yearly. It declined during the 1990s mainly because of social and economic changes and new opportunities for young, urban professionals. At that time emigration has slowly become a domain of blue-collar workers unable to adapt to market requirements (Iglińska, 2001).

Therefore it was predicted that since the second half of the 1990s, along with the successful and dynamic progress of the economic transformation and, social changes Poland would gradually shift from a major sending country of the CEE region into a country of net-immigration and transit migration. The data suggested growing trends in the inflow of labor immigrants, refugees and transit migrants into Poland.

However, Poland's accession to the EU in May 2004 caused one of the biggest out migration in the post-war history of the country, and Poland became again one of the biggest exporter of labor forces. This time, within the enlarged EU.

It is difficult to offer explicit conclusions that could follow from the profit and loss account of the most recent wave of job migrations from Poland, and from reflecting on its consequences. However, in my opinion, the massive proportions of this outflow have resulted in its negative consequences outweighing its advantages. In the final result, however, a lot shall depend on what percentage of today's migrants will return to Poland, what their equipment in the form of the relevant job experience and skills will be, and how they will schedule their returns.

A negative natural population growth of 0.01% for 1997 rose to - 0.08% in 2006 (Central Statistical Office, 2008). Besides a decrease in the number of births, migrations were the other factor accounting for a real reduction in the population of Poland. The phenomenon of massive migration of young and educated job seekers results, in the long run, in the seepage of the nation's skilled labor and in the human capital reduction.

What can be counted among the advantages of the migration outflow on the macro level is definitely its lessening the tension in the social relations caused by the difficult situation in the labor market (pay tensions, the level of poverty). The unemployment rate in Poland has decreased from 20% reported for the beginning of 2004 to 9.5% (Autumn, 2008). Therefore, it is difficult to assert that the Polish labor market has lost as a result of the failed opportunity to provide employment for the young and well educated people. The Polish labor market seemed to be incapable of accommodating such a massive inflow of fresh graduates ready to enter it.

Additionally, an unusual increase in remunerations has been reported recently. In the period from February, 2007, to February, 2008, the average pay in Poland increased by 10% which meant an even faster increase in remunerations than that reported for Spain, Greece, or Portugal upon their accession to the EU. This is why it is considered that there is a need for a decidedly slower pay growth rate: to avoid running the risk of inflation. The most pessimistic scenario by the World Bank assumes that in the year 2009 the level of inflation in Poland may even hover around 8% (the corresponding figure for January, 2008, was 4.6%).

On the other hand however, the increase in remunerations which can be seen recently results in a corresponding increase in the labor costs, and consequently, in the lowered attractiveness of Poland for foreign direct investors.

Who are direct beneficiaries of the migrations are, in most cases, the Polish immigrants who have found legal jobs and legal opportunities to earn money abroad. However, a conclusion which seems to be self-evident at this point is that, since most of them are taking up jobs for which the required level of competence and education is lower than theirs, some of them may soon turn out to be the greatest losers in this process. There will be no big chances for them to get promoted in Great Britain; nor will they have such opportunities in Poland after the years of doing unskilled jobs in the service sector. Should they come back to Poland anyway, we may have to deal,

in lots of cases, with the phenomenon of double marginalization which may result in an increase in the unemployment rates, in particular when shown by region.

The next issue is related to the social costs of the outflow process, namely to the costs of separation from the family, of family disintegration, and of the lowering growth dynamics in certain regions related to the weakening of social ties. Recently, a new term has appeared in the media discourse on the consequences of migrations: Euro-orphans, children placed in orphanages or children's homes because of their parent / their parents seeking jobs abroad. Mass media quote their data revealing the existence of as many as 150,000 so-called Euro-orphans in Poland. However, since this phenomenon does not enable any reliable assessment, the numbers should, in my opinion, be treated prudently²⁰. The research commissioned by the Office of the Children's Ombudsman in the period from February to March, 2008, shows that this number may hover around the level of 10-15 thousand pupils, which, on the other hand, is disquieting in itself (*Biuletyn Migracyjny* – extra edition for March-April, 2008)

Money transfers from migrants are one of the advantages of the outflow of job-seeking population abroad. According to the report by the Ministry of Economy (*Impact of the Migration ...*, 2007) the earnings transferred from the Polish migrants' accounts reached in 2005 the level of 1% of the GDP, i.e. 3% of the exports and 30% of the total of the foreign direct investment capital inflow to Poland in the years 2004-2005. Consequently, the transfers may, in the short run, counterbalance the outflow of funds due to investment-reluctant behavior of foreign direct investors in Poland. In the long run, however, as it is shown in the migration theory, job seeking migrants start shifting to different thinking patterns: no longer focused on their homeland, but on their new prospects in the receiving countries which tells itself in lower levels of money transfers, for example (Castels and Miller, 1993).

In accordance with the estimates of the National Bank of Poland, in 2007 the emigrants transferred to Poland more than 20 billion zlotys. That amount was by 2.8 billion zlotys bigger than the transfers made in 2006, and more than twice as big as the transfers made in the year 2004. The biggest amounts, hovering around the level of 5 billion zlotys altogether, were sent by the Poles employed in Great Britain. Ireland, with the corresponding amount of 4.6 billion zlotys, came second to the UK. Germany which, as early as 2005, was in the lead in respect of the money transfers to Poland has recently dropped to number three. According to the NBP, the United States is also losing to a number of EU countries out of which it is Italy, the Netherlands, France and Norway which are the most important in this context.

As it follows from the report by the Ministry of Economy (*Wpływ emigracji...*, 2007), the volume of the cash in circulation (excluding the cash at bank) increased from 50 to 67 billion zlotys in the period from May, 2004 to October, 2006. Since the volume of bank deposits for that period remained unchanged the authors of this report ascertain that what was mainly responsible for that increase was bigger amounts of foreign currencies exchanged into zlotys at money exchanges offices. What could be seen in the structure of foreign currency purchases effected by banks with the

²⁰ <http://fakty.interia.pl/prasa/polityka/news/eurosieroty,1010372>

participation of both natural persons and money exchange offices was a significant increase in the British pound (GBP) share. In 2006 the total of the Pound Sterling purchases accounted for as little as 6% of the total of all the purchased foreign currencies, and equaled 401 billion EUR. In 2005 the Pound Sterling purchases whose worth was already on the level of 761 billion PLN accounted for as much as 12% of the total of the foreign currency purchases made for that year to rise, in the first half of 2006, to 15% (equivalent to 541 billion EUR).

Reflecting on the effects of money transfers one should not leave out of account their negative consequences related to the moral-hazard problem. Researchers dealing with the impact of money transfers from migrating family members upon the behaviors and the economic coping strategies of the households in the receiving countries noticed that the families of migrating job seekers, left behind in the country of their origin, gradually reduced their occupational and money-earning activity relying on the money transfers as a method to secure their well-being (Kyle 2000, Pries 2006). As a result, this may lead to economic stagnation, in particular on the regional level.

It poses a significant threat to Poland. The most recent results of the survey done on the Polish migrants in Great Britain, included in this analysis, indicate that most migrants do not think of making big investments or improving their standard of living through the migration. Their savings mostly serve various consumption needs, as well as meeting the ongoing needs of their families left behind in Poland.

Table 5 Profit and loss account for the job migrations after 2004

Level / scope	Advantages	Disadvantages
Macro (national level)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decrease in the unemployment rate (export of unemployment, in particular as shown by region). • Increase in earnings. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Real reduction in population. • Seepage of the nation's skilled labor. • Human capital reduction. • Inflation risk. • Lowered attractiveness for foreign direct investors. • Shortages in the labor market. • Lowered growth dynamics (in particular, as shown by region).
Mezo (household and family level)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Money transfers (increased consumption, covered costs of the current expenses, investments) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Separation / family disintegration. • Weakened social ties (in particular, as shown by region). • Reduced economic activity of households (the moral-hazard problem).
Micro (individual level)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Job opportunities • Earnings • Possibility to develop job experience, acquire new skills, and raise qualifications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Brain waste' phenomenon. • No chances for development abroad; no possibility to develop in the country (on a long-term basis). Phenomenon of double marginalization. Social exclusion.

Source: Own compilation

One of the consequences of the most recent wave of migrations from Poland were, irrespective of a still high unemployment rate, shortages of labor force in the labor market. At the beginning of 2006 as much as 20% of construction companies complained about labor shortages respecting medium- and low-skilled workers (compared with as little as 4% reported for that sector before 1st May, 2004). By way of comparison: 21% of companies operating in the car market (as contrasted with 7% before the EU enlargement), 25% of companies representing the furniture sector (as contrasted with 11% before the EU enlargement), as much as 34% of the woodworking industry, 24% of the papermaking industry, and 23% of the Hi-Fi sector complained about shortages in the labor force at the beginning of 2006.

The educational system reform in the second half of the 1990s resulted in closing a majority of vocational schools and a considerable number of technical schools. Teachers employed there were, naturally, made to change their qualifications, as a result of which today's unemployed may not be trained so quickly as the employers looking for labor force would wish.

The lobbying done by organizations of employers desperate for workers was so hard that it caused a change in the migration policy strategy for Poland which, before 2006, was restrictive about the presence of foreigners legally employed in Poland aiming, first and foremost, in the context of the high local unemployment rate, at the protection of the domestic labor market against the inflow of potential immigrants.

The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy opted for a possibility to employ foreign contract workers from India, China, or Bangladesh in Polish enterprises. That draft project was, however, rejected by the Ministry of Interior and Administration on the grounds that, for most of the workers from the Far East employed in Poland, having a job in our country may only be a transitional phase in their migration to any of the old EU-15 member countries.

The Polish labor market opened itself to the East, but, instead, to the Most Near East: to the closest neighbors of Poland. On 31st August, 2006, Polish employers got authorization to employ workers from the three countries by which Poland is bordered to the east. Ukrainian, Russian and Belarus workers could be employed in Poland for three months in each six-month period, for which they were not required to have work permits. However, it was only the farming sector that was concerned in the waived requirement for work permits. The pressure from employers seeking to hire foreign workers, especially in the construction sector, brought about still another modification. In June, 2007, the right to employ foreign workers with no permit required was extended to cover all the sectors of the Polish economy. However, the provision enabling employers to contract foreigners for only three months in each half-a-year period was still in force.

The demand of labor markets for both skilled and unskilled labor force caused further changes in the legal system and still more facilitated the procedures for employing workers from over the eastern border of Poland. On 1st February, 2008, the right to stay in Poland under a labor contract was extended to cover six months in each period of 12 successive months.

The consequences of facilitating the relevant procedures as described above are clearly reflected in the statistics. In the first half of 2007 Polish employers filed 23.115 requests for contract workers from the east out of which number 21.513 concerned Ukrainians, 1,400 – Belarus workers, and 202 – workers from Russia. In the second half of 2007 the number of such requests increased to 24.500.

RETURN MIGRATION?

It was stressed at the beginning of this paper that migratory stereotypes are historically rooted in the perception of population outflows and inflows as settlement migration. It seems however, that contrary to contemporary opinions on growing trends in a circular labor mobility and decreasing trends in long-term or permanent migration on the east-west European axis the post enlargement labor migration from Poland may support the old stereotype. To support this thesis recent estimates on migratory flows from Poland and data on remittances transferred are presented below.


A principle of international migration is that networks between sending and receiving areas are maintained by an ongoing process of return migration comprising both recurrent migrants who regularly go home for varying periods each year and previously settled migrants who settle back in their communities of origin (Massey et al., 1987). That every migration stream breeds a counter stream (Ravenstain, 1885), and the process of settlement in a receiving area is partially countered by a concomitant return migration (Cornelius, 1978; Mines 1981) are sociological truism. However, that which is the norm for migratory behaviors for certain ethnic groups was not visible among the Poles spread all over the world during the communist era (Iglicka, 2001:106).

Before the First and the Second World Wars, many Polish emigrants did return to their homeland. Return migration from America to Polish territory prior to the First World War was estimated at approximately 30 per cent of the original emigration (Walaszek, 1984; Pilch and Zgorniak, 1984). After the Second World War however, the stream of return migration diminished to a trickle (Iglicka, 2001:106).

Enormous range of Polish emigration, which had been earlier in focus of the global debate, have surrendered its seat to the question whether and how many of Polish emigrants are returning in face of the better economic situation in Poland.

The discrepancies appear in large number in the mass media coverage. The latter often dwells on the estimates based on various surveys among small samples, not representative of all who left the country. Allegedly Polish emigrants are coming back or do want to do so, but such an anecdotal evidence cannot serve as facts and real numbers' substitute, especially when those deny such opinion. Thus such estimates might be a part of political tactic aimed at encouraging emigrants to return or the uncertain anticipation of the trend that might happen but is not taking place now (Iglicka, Ziolk, forthcoming).

Central Statistical Office in its most recent estimates reports that at the end of 2007, 2 270 thousands of Polish citizens migrated temporarily abroad, nearly two million of them to the other European countries. Such numbers indicate the constant increase in Polish emigration. In comparison to the data from 2006, 320 thousands more Polish citizens have been registered in foreign countries. However, while these estimates do not include those who work illegally or some seasonal workers, who usually stay up to 3 months and very often are not registered at all, some statistics of the destination countries might be misleading.



Source: *Informacja o rozmiarach...* Central Statistical Office, Warsaw, 2008

The reports that base their conclusions on Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) in the Great Britain will be a good example here, for they arguing that the number of Polish emigrants in the UK significantly decreases. This in turn not necessarily indicates that the return migration starts in Poland, as many of Polish emigrants might simply not be registered at all.


That some of Polish emigrants might have changed their destination country, leaving GB for places where the living and working conditions are better, like to the emerging new destinations, e.g. Norway or Spain, is also worth mentioning. Automatically they are out of WRS, but still not back in Poland (see chart 5).

The data from the National Bank of Poland (NBP) provide another indicator of stabilizing or even strengthening of the Polish emigration abroad. More than PLN 20 billions (about EURO 6,25 billions) was transferred to Poland by short and long-term emigrants in 2007 and despite steadily appreciation of Polish currency, it is more than double in comparison to the year 2004. It is the result of a better positions of Polish emigrants and network building on the labor markets abroad.

The newest NBP data also indicate that even within the last year there is a quite a change in earnings send to Poland. The amount of money transferred to Poland in the first decade of 2008 was by 100 millions higher than in the first decade of 2007.

Moreover, in 2007, workers' remittances tripled when compared with 2004 overall. Ireland and Great Britain were the countries where such significant increase has been noticed distinctly. (see Chart 6 below).

Chart 6 Geographical breakdown of workers' remittances 2004, 2007.



Source: National Bank of Poland, Department of Statistics, 2008.

Whether Polish emigrants are likely to head back in the near future, is a matter of speculations. The current data, however, cannot prove that either. The declarations on the parts of emigrants allegedly willing to come back or to stay abroad, derived from some surveys, provide a good source for social analysis but they will not reflect

the exact migration situation of the present. The latter depends on the media and politicians in their potential use or misuse for the purpose of shaping public opinion. By no means, however, the anecdotal evidences from the press can uproot the truth of the Polish emigration, which is still on the increase (Iglicka, Ziolek, forthcoming).

I am assuming that contemporary Polish wage migrants will not behave as the migrants of the communist period, when the departure from Poland meant one way departure only. However, even if contemporary Polish migrants in the UK will repeat behavioral pattern of their ancestors, leaving to America and coming back in one third of their number, it should not be forgotten that it means the most of them will remain on emigration. In regard to what was stated above, frequently repeated issue that “there is nothing more permanent than a temporary migrant”, borne out of experiences of the postwar Europe, may be also repeated in case of post-accession migrations.

CONCLUSIONS

The tendency of a decreasing attractiveness of the U.S. as a migration country has been observed on a global scale since 2001. The number of issued student visas in the years 2001-2003 decreased by 80 thousand (27%) and the number of visas issued to skilled workers dropped by 60 thousand (which was also equal to 27%)²¹.

Recent studies conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center demonstrate that U.S. immigration policy after September 11th produced the least expected results: legal migration to the USA has decreased whereas the ever-so-strong demand for labor in American economy led to the increase of illegal migration, mostly from the Latin America and Asia²².

The dramatically diminished attractiveness of the U.S. as a country of both settlement and labor migration for young and educated people from Central Europe is due to economic factors and geopolitical factors, i.e. dollar decline versus Polish zloty and EU enlargement and not to a restrictive immigration policy.

Studies on labor migration to the USA revealed that young respondents emphasized the importance of cultural differences and negative stereotypes of Poles in the U.S. as one of the obstacles to their settlement in the USA.

Historically different socio-economic-cultural circumstances of a Polish ethnic community in the States and European countries can also account for the fall of an American myth among young Poles at the beginning of the 21st century in the period of far-reaching modernization.

²¹ Wucker, M., 2006, National Security and Noncitizens in the United States after 9/11, in: K. Iglicka (ed), *Immigration Policies and Security*, CSM, Warszawa.

²² Witt, A., 2006 (:11), ‘Challenges in the Area of Immigration, Integration and Security’, in: K. Iglicka (ed), *Immigration Policies and Security*, CSM, Warszawa .

As a result of the emergence of private tertiary education services on the market higher education became in the period of transformation a readily available commodity for the residents of small towns and villages²³.

Young inhabitants of small localities, large numbers of whom have been recently graduating from colleges and universities and who have become familiar with the big city life during their studies, decided after 2004 to migrate to European countries rather than to the US, where their lives and work would be essentially limited to a narrow and controlling milieu of a Polish community.

Decline of the U.S. popularity as a migration destination for young and educated people is also accentuated by official data on visa issuance. Indeed, it seems that the United States lost Central Europeans in the global competition for labor.

The globalization of trade and labor markets along with decreasing demographic potential of Europe requires certain opening of the borders that is not easily reconcilable with the entrance control measures deployed. Therefore, in particular EU-15 member states, aside from taking into consideration new areas emitting immigrants, the tacit presupposition is adopted that the demand for low and medium skilled labor force is satisfied in these countries by employees from the new member states, arriving within the framework of the migrations inside the EU and within the framework of successive so called openings of labor markets. Highly qualified personnel in turn is to be recruited from the Third World countries.

There is an amount of logic in these assumptions. The immigrants performing minor jobs and descending from other cultures were associated in the past in receiving societies of Western Europe mostly with the pathologies of all kinds. On the other hand, the immigrants performing minor jobs and without the possibility of promotion felt socially and culturally alienated. Such situation brought to exclusion of substantial, foreign part of West Europe societies, formation of ethnic ghettos, emerging of social tensions and crisis of multicultural model as a result²⁴.

Well educated immigrants working on the slots in line with their profession were never a problem for Europe. The poor ones were a problem. Such assumption will therefore level, on my opinion, possible cultural tensions. The Poles, the Lithuanians, the Czechs and the Slovaks easily integrate; the religious or cultural conflicts between newcomers and receiving society are also not possible. The question

²³ In the period of last 15 years the number of students in the tertiary education has increased in a whole Central European region. Consequently, percentage of students in the EU- 15 is currently lower than the percentage of students in new EU member countries. For more detail see: . Weizsacker, J., 2006, 'Welcome to Europe: A European Blue Card Proposal' in: K.Gmaj i K. Iglicka (eds), *Brain Drain or Brain Gain – a Global Dilemma*, CSM, Warszawa.

²⁴ Also the latest report of British House of Lords warns that in the case of the UK the greatest defeated of the last immigration wave are participant/immigrants of the previous waves, who do not yet integrated with the British society and already begun to lose with the cheaper employees from the EU-8 on the labor market. The report warns also that in the long perspective the positive effects of the last wave of immigration for the British economy will be leveled by the remittances from the social security system (www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/ld/ldeconaf.htm). So it is to be remembered that also in countries that made relatively few mistakes in their immigration and integration policies it is emigrants who always pay costs and it is their presence always in connection with the tensions in welcoming society.

remaining open is where the new member states, including Poland, may/are able to gain employees from, both skilled and not, in the days of global and very strong labor force competition?

However the biggest mistake in migration policies was made by South Europe countries (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002), which showed inability to adapt administration structures to changing global migration patterns. Through the specific migration control model consisting of issuing limited number of visas with labor permission, by establishing of extremely difficult conditions for employers who wanted to employ legal migrant-workers the governments of South Europe states closed in certain way the door for legal inflow. At the same time, governments of those countries did not undertake the least effort to control their borders (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002:255). As a result in Southern European model we have to do with rapidly growing number of illegal migrants that slipped out of state's control, and with anxiety in receiving societies concerning range of illegal migration. In addition, performed regulatory actions that resulted in hundreds of thousands of illegal migrants legalizing their stay, encourage next waves of illegal newcomers, and the circle closes that way.

When USA or the Southern Europe countries had been creating the frameworks of their migration policies, the firm international framework limiting individual approach of a given country to the recruitment of employees did not even exist. In present times there is a lot of such limitations. Moreover, the global labor force competition is stronger and the specter of European demographic crisis is often and often taken into consideration by policy makers considering programs and schemes of the immigrant labor force recruitment. Poland should develop own migration policy based on models of old immigrational countries of Europe, such as Austria and Germany (the Middle-East Europe immigrational states without colonies and with equal approach to the idea of *nation state*²⁵ forming at the same time) by creating encouragement for highly skilled immigrants from outside of the EU countries and not allowing to many unskilled worker recruitment programs. Recruitment of the last category might be stimulated indirectly by the repatriation channel or by the programs of recruitment of seasonal laborers.

However, I think that in order to not to be on a hiding to nothing in the global struggle for the foreign labor force, the common strategy for the block of the countries during the process of migration transformation shall be developed on international scene. Thus, working out common premises in regard to directions and political strategies of migration policy in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, as well as the countries during the process of migration transformation would be also desirable.

Many analysts think that new member states will imitate the pattern of countries of Southern Europe in their migration politics, that is the countries which transformed

²⁵ From historical point of view in more countries of the Central-Eastern Europe the prevailing criterion of nationality was ethnicity or belonging to the cultural group. In the Central-Eastern Europe countries that existed at the meeting point of cultures and religions over centuries, endangered by pillaging, invasions and partitions, and which actively took part in dawns and collapses of empires, partitions, loosing and regaining independence, unifications and divisions, one of not formally articulated political aims was to retain cultural one-sidedness. Although in the days of globalization of labor markets and mass international migrations such aim seems to be difficult to achieve in itself, yet belonging to the civic society is not regarded - subconsciously or consciously - as simultaneous and automatic belonging to the national state in this part of Europe. For more see: Castles and Miller (1993).

quite recently from emigration to immigration areas. In certain sense Polish migration policy allowed in the past quasi-Italian model to come into being, when legions of newcomers from Ukraine begun illegal work in Poland. It should not be allowed however in the Polish discourse to the situation where these legions become some time “army of evil”²⁶ – and that is easy to achieve through the fact of inhibiting the legal inflow with simultaneous consent to illegal one.

The last maneuvers in immigration policies of such countries as Germany, France, United Kingdom or USA show adaptive capabilities of contemporary democracies. Democratic state has the possibility of inflow control, and the increase in the number of migrants may take place through legal channels of migration. In the case of USA, continuously high level of illegal migrations is being justified rather by cultural and historical factors than economic or demographic situation (Weil, 1998).

In the days of increased competition for the legal inflow of immigrants and control over the illegal one, one should nevertheless consider the flexible treatment of temporal migrants, that is the migrant working guests. American experiences with programs of employees’ recruitment as well as European teach that with the emergence of working guests, durable connection networks between the emitting and receiving countries come into being, the networks that are the source of illegal migration in the future. Hence one should not apply single solution model. As was already mentioned in the earlier fragments of this paper, creating of return stimuli is effective only in the case of certain temporal migrants, while the other should have the possibility of application for permanent stay in migration country, after years of stay.

Another matter connected with temporal migrants concerns the issue of exploitation of foreign laborers and execution of law in the principles of programs for foreign laborers.

In the view of these investigations the proposals presented by American administration in the year 2004 seem to be worth considering also in Polish situation. Namely the proposal that the social insurance premiums be paid after coming back of temporal migrant to the native country and that the visa with work permission should not be tied to one employer only. The possibility of signing the agreements on social insurance with countries of eastern neighborhood is worth being considered as well.

Future changes in the population trends and in the strategies of migration policies in Central-Eastern Europe are quite a challenge both for researchers and the policy makers.

²⁶ The Prime Minister of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, next day after winning a election (April 2008), said, *One of the first thing my government is going to do is closing the borders and building the camps, where I will isolate from society those newcomers from outside the Italy, who are not employed and enter the path of crime. Illegal immigrants are the army of evil. We need more police on the streets. The officers must become the army of good that will isolate decent citizens from the army of evil (Gazeta Wyborcza, 17 April 2008).*

The result of research presented in this analysis shows deeper, as transatlantic, dimension of Europeans' migrations. I hope that realization of postulate put forward by Thistlethwaite (1963), one of the migration research's classics, the postulate (that is half of a century old) to *tear down the curtain of salty water* and analyze migrations both from American and European perspectives, will contribute to better understanding of mechanisms underlying phenomenon of migration and will help to work out better solutions in regard to recruitment of foreign workers on the both sides of the Atlantic.

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